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FOR WHOM DOES THE BELL TOLL: 
THE BELL TOLLS FOR BROWN? 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig* 
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPE S FOR RACIAL RE FORM. By Derrick Bell. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. x, 201. Cloth, $25; paper, 
$14.95. 
No man is an /land, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of himselfe out 
of the Continent, a part of the maine .... 
-John Donne 
Fifty years after the landmark decision Brown v. Board of 
Education,1 black comedian and philanthropist Dr. Bill Cosby 
astonished guests at a gala in Washington, D.C., when he stated, 
'"Brown versus the Board of Education is no longer the white person's 
problem. (Black people] have got to take the neighborhood back . . . .  
(Lower economic Blacks] are standing on the comer and they can't 
speak English."'2 Cosby, one of the wealthiest men in the United 
States, complained about "lower economic" Blacks3 "not holding up 
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1994, Grinnell College; 
J.D. 1997, University of Michigan. - Ed. Thanks to Derrick Bell, Kathy Bergin, Alan 
Brownstein, Joel Dobris, Bill Hing, Kevin Johnson, Evelyn Lewis, Madhavi Sunder, and 
Marty West for their helpful comments and support. Dean Rex Perschbacher's support has 
been generous and invaluable. My research assistant Cherita Laney and the staff of the U.C. 
Davis Law Library, in particular Aaron Dailey, Susan Llano, and Erin Murphy, provided 
valuable assistance. Most importantly, I thank Jacob Willig-Onwuachi for his love and 
support. This Book Review is dedicated to my children, Elijah and Bethany, for whom I 
hope the promise of Brown v. Board of Education remains alive. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]. 
2. Richard Leiby, Bill Cosby, Back by Popular Demand, WASH. POST, May 23, 2004, 
atD3. 
3. Throughout this Book Review, I capitalize the word "Black" or "White" when used 
as a noun to describe a racialized group. Also, I prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term 
"African-Americans" because the term "Blacks" is more inclusive. Additionally, "[i]t is 
more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than 
say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be 
necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies." Alex M. Johnson, 
Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4 (1992). 
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their end in this deal."4 He then asked the question, "'Well, Brown 
versus Board of Education: Where are we today? [Civil rights lawyers 
and activists] paved the way, but what did we do with it?"'5 Cosby's 
comments drew both criticism and praise from the black community,6 
stirring a raging debate about black elitism and the unfulfilled promise 
of Brown and forcing a release of the frustration that many minorities 
feel about its failed promise.7 
In his new book Silent Covenants, Professor Derrick Bell8 
expounds upon this very disappointment, questioning "whether 
another approach than the one embraced by the Brown decision might 
have been more effective and less disruptive in the always-contentious 
racial arena" (p. 6). In so doing, Bell joins black conservatives in 
critiquing what he describes as civil rights lawyers' misguided focus on 
achieving racial balance in schools.9 The focus, Bell contends, should 
have been on enforcing the "equal" component of the "separate but 
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,10 in which the Supreme Court 
held that state-mandated racial segregation in railroad passenger cars 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment so long as the separate facilities were equal.11 
4. Theodore Shaw, Even Cosby Knows There ls More to the Story, TOPEKA CAP.-J., 
June 3, 2004, at A4. 
5. Leiby, supra note 2. 
6. Compare Joseph Perkins, A Message Black America Needs to Hear, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., July 9, 2004, at B7 (praising Cosby for giving a speech that was "a loud, clear 
wake-up call to black America"), with James Morton, Memo to Bill: Our Lost Values, 
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 13, 2004, at 20 (arguing that Cosby was wrong to blame the 
victims). 
7. See, e.g. , Leonard Pitts, Do White People Matter, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2004, § 1, at 19 
(describing his frustrations with the status of black people in the United States). 
8. Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Bell, the founder of 
Critical Race Theory, is also famous for his protest at Harvard Law School (where he was 
the first black tenured professor) against the school's failure to recruit and hire a black 
woman on its faculty and for his resignation from his position as dean of the University of 
Oregon Law School for its failures to hire an Asian-American woman on its faculty. See 
Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: "A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About 
Race," 82 TEX. L. REV. 717, 727 (2004) (noting that Bell left his tenured faculty position at 
Harvard Law School and "the deanship at the University of Oregon as part of his continuing 
efforts to diversify the law faculties at those law schools"); see also Adrien Katherine Wing, 
Derrick Bell: Tolling in Protest, 12 HARV. BLACKLEITER L.J. 161, 162 (1995) (book review). 
9. Black conservative thought on desegregation and education is partially premised on a 
denouncement of the integrationist ideal that was advanced by the black community during 
the late 1950s and 1960s - a position Bell, a black liberal, ironically defends in his book. See 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT? What Justice Clarence Thomas 
Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) 
(manuscript at 25-28, on file with author) (discussing black conservative thought on the issue 
of desegregation and education). 
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white and one­
eighth black, filed a lawsuit, seeking the rights, privileges, and immunity of Whites, after he 
was thrown out of a white railroad passenger car because of his race. See id. at 538. 
11. See id. at 544, 550-51. 
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Had Bell been on the Court in 1954, he would not have voted to 
overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy.12 
According to Bell, had the focus been on ensuring the equality of 
schools between minorities and Whites instead of maintaining racial 
balance as a means of obtaining quality education for minority 
children, the overall quality of public schools, regardless of their racial 
make-up, would be better. Additionally, Bell maintains that 
integration eventually would have occurred; only then it would have 
been the decision of Whites and white policymakers, who after 
recognizing the enormous expense of maintaining two separate, but 
truly equal school systems, would have chosen to integrate to protect 
their own economic interests (p. 106). 
The basis of Bell's conclusion is manifold. First, as Bell explains, 
Brown proved to be destructive for minorities because many Whites 
viewed the decision as dismantling all racially constructed barriers to 
success, a belief that ultimately created a space in which to blame 
minorities for any lack of progress instead of linking such failures to 
institutionalized racism.13 Additionally, Bell asserts, Brown was a 
failure because it neglected the social realities of race relations in the 
United States, in particular, the lengths to which many Whites would 
go to resist enforcement of the decision (pp. 95-101). Primarily, 
however, Bell's determinations are based on his interest-convergence 
theory, which can be stated in two rules: (1) policymakers 
accommodate the rights and interests of Blacks and other minorities 
only when those interests converge with the interests of Whites in 
policymaking decisions; and (2) even when policymakers do 
acknowledge the interests and rights of Blacks and other minorities, 
they are always willing to sacrifice those rights when they perceive 
their enforcement as significantly diminishing Whites' sense of 
12. Pp. 20-27; Derrick A. Bell, Bell, J. , Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE 
AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 185 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
13. P. 7; see Derrick Bell, The Real Lessons of a 'Magnificent Mirage,' CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Apr. 2, 2004, at BlO (claiming that Brown reinforced "the fiction that ... the path of 
progress would be clear"). Professor Siedman has also explained that: 
Brown . . . offered the country a kind of deal, and, from the perspective of defenders of the 
status quo, not a bad one at that .... [S]eparate facilities were now simply proclaimed to be 
inherently unequal. But the flip side of this aphorism was that once white society was willing 
to make facilities legally nonseparate, the demand for equality had been satisfied and blacks 
no longer had just cause for complaint. The mere existence of Brown thus served to satisfy 
the demands of liberal individualism and, therefore, to legitimate current arrangements. 
True, many blacks remained poor and disempowered. But their status was now no longer a 
result of the denial of equality. Instead, it marked a personal failure to take advantage of 
one's definitionally equal status. 
Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 (1992). 
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entitlement and superior societal status.14 Furthermore, Bell explains, 
even though many of the policies that harm racial minorities also hurt 
poor and working-class Whites, such Whites will often support these 
racial-sacrifice covenants and subordinate their own economic 
interests to maintain feelings of racial superiority. 15 
As expected, Bell's book is provocative and intelligent, providing a 
historical analysis of events that support his interest-convergence 
theory. It exposes how deeply entrenched racial hierarchy is in our 
society and how much the perpetuation of racism rests on a continued 
division between minorities and poor Whites (pp. 77-86). The book is 
a stimulating and eye-opening critique of a decision that has been 
championed by people of all races and ethnicities. I highly recommend 
the book, even if only to serve as a catalyst for engaging in discussions 
about the plight of minority children in public schools or, more so, the 
state of race relations in the United States. 
At the same time that I strongly agree with Bell's interest­
convergence theory, his thorough explanation of historical instances in 
which policymakers have sacrificed the rights of minorities in the 
United States, and many of his arguments concerning white resistance 
to integration, I disagree with Bell's conclusion that court enforcement 
of the "separate but equal" doctrine would have proved more 
effective than the strategy that civil rights lawyers employed in 
arriving at Brown. Unlike Bell, I am far more pessimistic about 
whether it even would have been possible within our society, which is 
dominated by a belief in white superiority,16 to have achieved "better" 
results in public schools. 
Indeed, Bell's own interest-convergence theory left me wondering 
how his proposed alternative decision to Brown would have avoided 
the inevitable sacrifice of minority rights that occurs whenever 
14. Pp. 9, 69; see Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest­
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 {1980) {describing the principle of 
interest convergence); see also Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A 
Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 
20-30 {1989) (explaining how legislation to help the poor must often converge with that of 
the middle class). As a general matter, Bell lays out his critique within the black-white 
paradigm of discussing race relations; as a consequence, my own review of his book also 
largely speaks within the black-white paradigm. See john a. powell, A Minority-Majority 
Nation: Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 
1413-14 (2002) (noting the weaknesses in the black-white paradigm but acknowledging its 
importance in highlighting the importance of power). But see generally Devon W. Carbado, 
Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283 (2002) (explaining why black-white 
conceptualizations of race are incomplete). 
15. Pp. 41-44, 80-85; see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707, 1741-43 (1993). 
16. See Regina Austin, Back to Basics: Returning to the Matter of Black Inferiority and 
White Supremacy in the Post-Brown Era, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79, 81-85, 91-95 (2004) 
(analyzing how notions of black inferiority and white supremacy continue to be embodied in 
the structures of public society). 
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minority interests diverge from those of Whites and white 
policymakers. Moreover, Bell's interest-convergence theory raised 
several significant questions that Bell does not address adequately in 
his book: First, how could segregation, if not truly by choice, ever 
produce true equality? In other words, even if the Brown Court had 
enforced the "separate but equal" standard in Plessy with the 
requirements and limits proposed in Bell's alternative opinion, how 
could we have truly expected equality in schools when the very 
separation of those schools was still premised on white supremacy, or 
rather, an accommodation of the desire of many Whites to remain 
segregated from "inferior" minorities? Furthermore, if Bell were to 
apply his own theory to the enforcement for equality in schools, how 
would Bell explain white policymakers' interests in even trying to 
make the schools equal, an act that had been avoided for more than 
fifty years prior to Brown? In other words, why would white and 
minority interests suddenly converge at this point and for this goal? Or 
more importantly, why would the Court have been any more capable 
of enforcing this doctrine than it was at enforcing integration? 
Furthermore, if white policymakers never reached a point of 
attempting to make schools equal, how then would they come to 
realize that integration was really in their best economic interests? 
And more so, even if Whites and white policymakers eventually chose 
to integrate to protect their own economic interests, what would have 
prevented them from developing two "separate but unequal" systems 
within any particular school, a system that presently exists in many 
integrated schools - with Blacks and Latinos tracked into lower 
courses and Whites tracked into advanced placement and honors 
courses? Finally, what would the course of the Civil Rights Movement 
have been without Brown? Bell argues that other forces, such as the 
Cold War, would have worked to create an environment in which the 
anti-discrimination legislation of the 1 960s would have been enacted. 
But would desegregation in other areas such as in busing, beaches, and 
other public accommodations have truly occurred without Brown? 
This Book Review probes all of these questions concerning the 
quest for racial equality in education and, in so doing, argues that 
Bell's approach to achieving racial equality (as outlined in Silent 
Covenants) would likely have landed minorities in exactly the same 
position as they are in today. Part I of the Review provides an 
overview of the current status of integration in public schools. Part II 
recounts important segments of Bell's book, detailing his analysis of 
how the failed promise of Brown fits within a long history of 
policymakers either disregarding or sacrificing minority rights (except 
when those rights coincide with the interests of Whites). Part III 
demonstrates how Bell's own interest-convergence theory does not 
support his criticism of Brown and his endorsement of the "separate 
1512 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1507 
but equal" strategy that he claims ultimately would have served 
minorities the best. Finally, this Book Review concludes with a brief 
analysis of the moral and practical benefits of the victory in Brown 
and a discussion about the potential for coalition building between 
minorities and poor Whites. 
I. AND WE ARE NOT SA VED17 
The Brown decision is one of the most celebrated cases in the 
history of the United States, having gained widespread acceptance 
among the general public today and a status of almost mythological 
proportions in the legal community.18 At the time Brown was handed 
down in 1954, many Blacks viewed the decision as a magical solution 
to the problem of racism and race discrimination.19 As Bell explains in 
his book, civil rights lawyers and activists held so much faith in the 
promise of Brown that Judge William Hastie, the first black man to be 
appointed as an Article III judge,20 advised a young Bell, who in 1957 
expressed his desire to  become a civil rights lawyer, "Son . . . I am 
afraid that you were born fifteen years too late to have a career 
in civil rights."21 
Unfortunately, Judge Hastie's hopes would prove wrong, and 
instead the words of Thomas Sowell in 1954, then a student at Howard 
17. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987) is Bell's first published book, which created Geneva Crenshaw (after whom 
Richard Delgado would later model Rodrigo Crenshaw) and addressed numerous issues 
concerning the status of Blacks in the United States, including crime, affirmative action, and 
reparations. See also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357-58 
(1992) (book review) (introducing Rodrigo as Geneva's brother). 
18. P. 2; see Edward Lazarus, Still Striving Toward a More Perfect Union, L.A. TIMES, 
May 16, 2004, at R3 ("Public acclaim for and acceptance of Brown are at a zenith as the half­
century milestone approaches. Today, public officials of every political stripe, and especially 
nominees to the federal courts, routinely rank the decision as the Supreme Court's 
finest . . . .  "); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political 
Correctness, 80 VA. L. REV. 185, 185 (1994) (describing the decision as "so politically 
sacrosanct that one cannot dispassionately discuss the decision's soundness as a matter of 
constitutional theory"). 
19. See James Patterson, Disappointing Impact on Schools - Brown v. Board After 50 
Years, PROVIDENCE J., June 8, 2004, at BOS (asserting that Thurgood Marshall "expected 
school segregation to be wiped out in the South within five years"); Kevin Sack, Breaking the 
Barrier, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at Al (discussing the experiences of Josephine Boyd, who, 
at 17, desegregated Greensboro Senior High School, became its first black graduate, and 
later noted that her "biggest disappointment [was] that this magical place [she] envisioned 
never came to be"). 
20. See Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the Search for the Promised Land, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 229 (1987) (book review) (noting that Hastie was the first black to sit on the federal 
bench). 
21. P. 3. But see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on the Significance of the 
Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 991, 998-1002 (2004) 
(discussing how elite Blacks who had been educated at historically black colleges did not 
necessarily view school desegregation as beneficial). 
May 2005] The Bell Tolls for Brown 1513 
University in Washington, D.C.,22 would prove prophetic. On the day 
that Brown was handed down, a young Sowell proclaimed soon after 
his professor had proudly announced the decision to the class, "It's 
been more than fifty years since Plessy v. Ferguson - and we don't 
have 'separate but equal.' What makes you think this is going to go 
any faster?"23 
Fifty years later, many minorities wonder what happened to the 
promise of Brown in America's public schools. The educational 
predicament in which many minorities, especially Blacks and 
Latinos,24 find themselves is bleak (pp. 127-29). For instance, statistics 
reveal that 1 1  percent of all Blacks between the ages of sixteen and 
nineteen are high school dropouts25 and that 27 percent of all Latinos 
between the ages of sixteen and nineteen are high school dropouts. 26 
Furthermore, almost half of the students in schools attended by the 
average black or Latino student are poor or near poor, meaning that 
these students are all eligible for the federal government's free or 
reduced-price lunch program.27 
Additionally, although the population in the United States is the 
most racially diverse in its history,28 the nation's public schools are 
22. Thomas Sowell is a notable black intellectual and a senior fellow at the Hoover 
Institute in Stanford, California. 
23. Thomas Sowell, Half a Century After Brown, TOWNHALL.COM, May 12, 2004, at 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20040512.shtml. 
24. My focus on Blacks and Latinos is not intended to ignore the plight of and 
discrimination against other minorities, nor is it meant to indicate that certain racial groups, 
such as Asian-Americans, do not suffer from discrimination. This author recognizes the 
complexity of how racism functions in society and the diversity of groups' political and 
economic power among Asian-Americans as whole, especially when concerning groups such 
as the Hmong, Vietnamese, and Cambodians, and within ethnic groups as well. See generally 
Symposium, Rethinking Racial Divides - Panel on Affirmative Action, 4 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 195 (1998). 
25. See Perkins, supra note 6 (noting that one out of every nine black students is a high 
school dropout). This dropout rate for Blacks is down from 21 percent in 1972; however, half 
of the decrease is due to the rise in imprisonment of young black males. See Marjorie 
Coeyman, The Story Behind Dropout Rates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July l, 2003, at 13. 
26. See Coeyman, supra note 25; see also Sarita E. Brown et al., Latinos in Higher 
Education: Today and Tomorrow, CHANGE, Mar./ Apr. 2003, at 40, 41 (stating that the high 
school dropout rate for Latinos is more than double the rate for Blacks and more than three 
times the rate for Whites). It is important to note that the dropout rate of high school age 
Latinos born in the United States is half that of all high school age Latinos, but still at an 
alarming 14 percent. See Coeyman, supra note 25. 
27. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED 
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM 35 & n.96 (2003), available at http://www. 
civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/ Are WeLosingtheDream.pdf. 
28. See Bill Ong Hing, Answering Challenges of the New Immigrant-Driven Diversity: 
Considering Integration Strategies, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 861, 862-68 (2002} (describing the 
growth in the Latino and Asian-American populations during the 1990s). 
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becoming increasingly more racially segregated.29 This is especially 
true in the South, which due to past desegregation orders, once housed 
the country's most' integrated schools, but is now rapidly retreating 
from such integration.30 
In fact, public schools today are more segregated than they were in 
the early 1970s.31 In many instances, this racial segregation correlates 
with poverty, resulting in fewer resources and services in minority 
schools.32 In fact, nearly 75 percent of all black and Latino students 
attend schools that are predominantly minority, most of which are 
poor or near poor.33 Additionally, nearly 2.4 million students attend 
what are referred to as "apartheid schools," schools that are 99-100 
percent minority schools, and of these students, 2.3 million are black 
and Latino, and only 72,000 are white.34 
Specifically, the percentage of black students attending majority 
white schools has been steadily decreasing over the last twenty years.35 
By 1998, the percentage of black students attending majority white 
schools in the South had decreased nearly 11  percent from 43.5 
percent to 32.7 percent.36 Likewise, the percentage of Latino students 
attending schools predominantly or exclusively minority had also 
increased steadily.37 In fact, Professor Gary Orfield and his research 
associates found that Latinos have been more segregated than Blacks 
for several years, not only by race and ethnicity but also by poverty.38 
Indeed, 76 percent of Latinos, as opposed to 72 percent of Blacks, 
attend predominantly minority schools.39 
29. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 4, 27; see also Julianne Malveaux, How 
Long? Cosby, Brown and Racial Progress, BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., June 17, 2004, at 
122 (asserting that schools are resegregating and racial economic differences persist). 
30. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 4, 27. Public schools in the Northeast 
are actually the most segregated, with almost 4 out of every 5 Blacks attending 
predominantly minority schools. See id. at 38. 
31. See Gary Orfield et al., The Resurgence of School Segregation, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, 
Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003, at 17. 
32. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 67; Orfield et al., supra note 31, at 19 
(stating that nine-tenths of intensely segregated schools for Blacks and Latinos have high 
concentrations of poverty). 
33. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 28. 
34. See id. 
35. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 37 & tbl.10. Although the number of 
black students attending majority white schools in the South increased between 1964 and 
1988 from just 2.3 percent to 43.5 percent, since 1988 that number has significantly declined. 
See id. 
36. See id. 
37. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2003). 
38. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 4, 32-33. 
39. See id. at 33. As of 2000, an unprecedented 37 percent of Latinos attended schools 
that were 90-100 hundred percent minority. See id. 
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Even more segregated than Latino students, however, are Whites, 
who, on average, attend schools where 80 percent of the student body 
is white.40 Furthermore, whereas Whites once constituted 80 percent of 
the public school population in 1968, they now constitute only 62 
percent today.41 If nothing else, it is clear that the bell is beginning to 
toll for Brown's former promise of integration in public schools and 
possibly, along with it, the hope of equal educational opportunity for 
children of all races and ethnicities. 
II. FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 42 
Black people are the magical faces at the bottom of society's well. Even 
the poorest whites, those who must live their lives only a few levels 
above, gain their self-esteem by gazing down on us . . . . Over time, many 
reach out, but most simply watch, mesmerized into maintaining their 
unspoken commitment to keeping us where we are, at whatever cost to 
them or to us. 
- Derrick Bell43 
In his book Silent Covenants, Derrick Bell uses his interest­
convergence theory to demonstrate how this seemingly impending 
"death" of Brown is merely one example of many instances in which 
the rights of minorities have been either disregarded or sacrificed by 
policymakers (p. 4). As stated, under Bell's interest-convergence 
theory, minority rights are acknowledged only when they further the 
interests of Whites, and an involuntary sacrifice of such rights and 
interests occurs whenever differences must be settled between two 
opposing groups of Whites (p. 29). As Bell explains, many other major 
points of history stand as marks of racial-sacrifice covenants where the 
interests of minorities were either recognized because of coinciding 
white interests or had to be forfeited for the interests of Whites and 
white policymakers (pp. 36-44, 50-68, 71-72). 
40. See id. at 4, 27; see also Yvonne Abraham & Francie Latour, School Study Finds 
Deep Racial Divide; Boston, Other Communities Reflect Impact of White Flight, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2003, at Al (reporting that in Boston, the vast majority of white children 
"attend schools that are typically 90 percent white and remarkably affluent"). 
41. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 27, at 23. Asian students are the most 
integrated, but even so, they attend schools that are on average 22 percent Asian, even 
though they constitute only 4 percent of the total student population. See id. at 27. 
42. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1992) is Bell's third book, in which he argues that white racism is a permanent, 
indestructible component of society. The book is famously known for the allegory "Space 
Traders," in which Whites in the United States vote to surrender Blacks to aliens for 
unknown purposes and unknown lands in exchange for unlimited wealth. See id. at 158-94. 
43. Id. at v. 
1516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1507 
For example, in analyzing the issuance of the Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1863, Bell lays bare the truth of Alexis de 
Tocqueville's observation that " [i]n the United States people abolish 
slavery for the sake not of the Negroes but of the white men."44 In 
particular, Bell explicates how President Abraham Lincoln, who 
personally condemned slavery, ended the institution not to protect 
Blacks but instead to preserve the Union. Noting how Lincoln 
repeatedly vetoed actions of officers who freed slaves in their areas of 
command during the Civil War (p. 53), Bell recounts how Lincoln's 
ultimate motive in freeing slaves was his desire to enlist thousands of 
Blacks into the Union army and thus win the Civil War and preserve a 
nation (pp. 54-55, 71). Indeed, Bell's best evidence of Lincoln's 
primary purpose in recognizing Blacks' rights to freedom comes from 
Lincoln himself who once asserted, '"If there be those who would not 
save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I 
do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to 
save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I 
could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it"' (p. 53; 
emphasis added). In sum, as Bell eloquently argued, Blacks were 
merely the racially fortuitous beneficiaries of a decision intended to 
further the best interests of the country, and not to recognize Blacks as 
human beings and citizens. 
Throughout Silent Covenants, Bell follows up with more 
contemporary examples of interest-convergence results. For example, 
Bell illustrates how George Wallace used race-baiting to win his 
second race for Governor in Alabama as soon as he discovered that 
the interests of Blacks no longer converged with his own. As Bell 
explains, after Wallace lost his first race for Governor to a candidate 
endorsed by the Ku Klux Klan, Wallace vowed never to '"be out­
niggered again"' and changed his moderate position on integration to 
become a segregationist (p. 42-43). The end result was that Wallace 
won, and Blacks lost, with Wallace later assuring Alabamians that he 
would stand in the schoolhouse door to keep black students from 
entering the University of Alabama (p. 43). 
Similarly, as with the political career of Wallace, Bell shows how 
the recent debates on affirmative action constitute a contemporary 
example of the interest-convergence sacrifice of minority interests, 
especially those of Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans. In 
particular, Bell highlights how numerous schools continue to rely on 
standardized tests, such as the SAT and the LSAT, even though 
studies show that the tests are poor at predicting performance in or 
after school for minorities and are more accurate at predicting 
44. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 344 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1848). 
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parental wealth.45 As Bell makes plain, "standardized tests are 
retained for the convenience of the schools even though they privilege 
applicants from well-to-do families," and "Black, other minorities, 
and . . .  all nonwealthy applicants' interest in fair admissions criteria 
are sacrificed" (p. 46), with the end result being the reinforcement of 
standards that have historically disadvantaged minorities, endless 
deliberations about why certain minorities simply cannot cut it, and 
the maintenance of standards that privilege the white upper-class (pp. 
139-42, 155-57) . Surprisingly, Bell is, in this sense, agreeing with black 
conservative Justice Clarence Thomas, who in Grutter v. Bollinger46 
proclaimed that the University of Michigan Law School's use of the 
LSAT, a test that is known to produce racially disparate results, was 
questionable and called for the law school to re-evaluate its 
standards.47 In fact, as Justice Thomas implies in his dissent, Bell 
contends that Grutter itself is an interest-convergence phenomenon, 
with minorities being the fortuitous beneficiaries of the decision and 
the real beneficiaries being the already privileged who not only benefit 
from white upper-class bias but, according to Justice O'Connor, also 
benefit by being "'better prepare[d] . . .  for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society. "'48 
45. Pp. 46, 140; see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: 
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988 (1996) (reporting and analyzing 
data from the Educational Testing Service regarding the correlation between wealth and 
high SAT scores); see also Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and 
Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 
1070-79 (1997); Tobias Barrington Wolff & Robert Paul Wolff, The Pimple on Adonis's 
Nose: A Dialogue on the Concept of Merit in the Affirmative Action Debate, 56 HASTINGS 
L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (highlighting how current admissions plans help those who need the 
assistance least); Lani Guinier, Our Preference for the Privileged, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 
2004, at A13 ("Admissions decisions reflect a preoccupation with measures of excellence 
that tell us more about grandparents' wealth than first-year college grades."). 
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
47. Id. at 349, 369-70 (Thomas, J . ,  concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to 'correct' for black 
underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic 
student body."); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dismantle 
His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 46 ARIZ. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 56-57, on file with author) (discussing Justice 
Thomas's critique of the LSA T). But see Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1622, 1629-31 (2003) (criticizing Justice Thomas for his anti-affirmative action 
stance). 
48. Pp. 149-51 .  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American 
Educational Research Association et al. at 3); see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 9 
(manuscript at 75-79, on file with author) (analyzing Justice Thomas's dissent in Grutter as a 
critique of how affirmative action fails to deal with the underlying problems of the racial gap 
in education); see also Juan F. Perea, Buscando America: Why Integration and Equal 
Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1452-53 (2004) (declaring that 
the Court made it clear that affirmative action was not for Blacks, but for Whites, by 
describing how "[a]ffirmative action yields clear benefits for Whites - the possibility of less 
racial stereotyping, better-trained and better-informed future national leaders, enhanced 
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Much like the abolition of slavery and the use of traditional merit 
standards that have the effect of requiring racial preferences, Bell 
contends that Brown I in 1954 and Brown Il49 in 1955 together 
represent a classic example of the interest-convergence phenomenon 
or "racial fortuity" (p. 69). In a chapter entitled "Brown as an 
Anticommunist Decision," Bell illustrates how the vote on Brown I 
sustains the first half of his interest-convergence theory - that 
policymakers accommodate the interests of minorities only when such 
interests converge with their own. Noting that Blacks had been 
battling for desegregation for decades before the first Brown decision, 
Bell reveals how the decision in Brown I was basically inevitable 
because it was the only way that the United States could continue to 
invoke moral authority over the Soviet Union during the Cold War 
(pp. 63, 67). As Bell establishes, because newspapers across the world 
published stories about the pervasive discrimination against and 
murders of minorities in the United States, and because the NAACP 
also filed a petition with the United Nations seeking to force the 
United States to be "'just to its own people,"' the United States 
needed, at least on its face, to eliminate the oppressive racial caste 
system within its borders (pp. 60-63, 67). Indeed, as Bell points out, 
the NAACP's briefs and several amicus briefs filed in desegregation 
cases before the Supreme Court "stressed the international 
implications of racial discrimination, focusing both on the negative 
impact on U.S. foreign policy of a decision affirming segregation, and 
the positive value of a decision striking down segregation policies."50 
While no one knows whether the Court discussed such issues during 
deliberations, as Bell notes, the impact of repeated statements about 
understanding of non-White races, economic benefits in a global economy, and a more 
demographically representative military and civilian leadership"). But see Michelle Adams, 
Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 How. L.J. 795, 
827 (2004) (arguing that Grutter is promising as it affirmed integration "because of its 
importance in enhancing the lives of Americans more generally . . .  [as opposed to] 
enhancing the lives of minority group members specifically" because it allows Whites not to 
think of affirmative action as something that solely benefits people of color). 
49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter Brown II]. 
50. P. 64. See, for example, the amicus brief of the Justice Department in Brown I: 
[D]uring the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations attributable to [race 
discrimination] has become progressively greater. The United States is under constant attack 
in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the United 
Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups in this 
country . . . . [T]he undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives unfriendly 
governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their propaganda warfare. 
MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 100 (2000) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 7, Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (alterations in original). 
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the international effects of the future decision in numerous briefs was 
likely strong.51 
After analyzing how Brown I was ultimately an anti-Communist 
decision, Bell explains how the issuance of Brown II supports the 
second half of his interest-convergence theory - that when 
policymakers fear a remedial racial policy is threatening the superior 
status of Whites, policymakers will sacrifice those rights of racial 
minorities. As Bell and many other race scholars have argued, one of 
the forces behind Brown II was the desire to allow integration on 
terms that the white South could accept,52 including poor and working­
class Whites who depended on a segregative system to validate their 
superiority to minorities. Thus, when the Court issued its second 
decision in Brown II in 1955, the interests of minorities were once 
again "sold out" as the Court ignored the pleas of civil rights attorneys 
to end segregation immediately and instead held that the lower federal 
courts were to "enter [desegregation] orders and decrees consistent 
with [its] opinion ... with all deliberate speed. "53 
What did "all deliberate speed" eventually come to mean? 
Thurgood Marshall, lead counsel for Brown, often explained his 
understanding of the phrase "all deliberate speed" as "S-L-0-W. "54 As 
Bell exhibits, Marshall was correct about the phrase's meaning, as the 
movement to integrate in the South was indeed slow, and the Court's 
nebulous order opened the doors wide for segregationists to protest 
integration at all costs (pp. 95, 107). 
Indeed, as Bell lays out, white segregationists were even willing to 
close their schools to avoid racial integration.55 They warned that 
51. See Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102, 104-
05 (arguing that the Court's cites to briefs from the military and businesses in Grutter 
indicate that the Court in 1954 may have been influenced by statements concerning the 
international implications of Brown for the Cold War). 
52. See Charles J. Ogletree Jr., The Flawed Compromise of 'All Deliberate Speed,' 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 2, 2004, at B9 (asserting that this compromise "left the 
decision flawed from the beginning"). 
53. Brown /I, 349 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added); see Sunstein, supra note 51, at 103 
(quoting Thurgood Marshall as saying '"In 1954, I was delirious. What a victory! I thought I 
was the smartest lawyer in the entire world. In 1955, I was shattered. They gave us nothing 
and then told us to work for it. I thought I was the dumbest Negro in the United States."). 
54. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Reflections on the First-Half Century of Brown v. Board 
of Education, Part I, 28 CHAMP. 6, 10 (2004); see also John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of "Hint 
and Run" History: A Critique of Professor Borchers's "Limited View" of Pennoyer v. Neff, 
28 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 591, 688 (1995) (noting that "a decade or more of 'all deliberate 
speed' gave [Brown's due process reasoning] the pale force of a dictum"). 
55. P. 96; see also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Griffin, the 
Supreme Court held that action of the Prince Edward County School Board in closing its 
public schools - while simultaneously contributing to the support of private segregated 
white schools that took the public schools' place - denied black children equal protection of 
the laws. See id. at 225. 
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desegregation would lead to miscegenation, and they moved to mainly 
white suburbs and school districts or enrolled their children in private, 
all-white schools, which were often funded by state monies.56 They 
challenged integration strongly and passionately.57 One avid 
segregationist in Delaware even promised in 1954 that " [his] 
'daughters [would] never attend school with Negroes so long as there 
[was] breath in [his] body and gunpowder [would] burn."'58 
In fact, as Bell explains, Brown did not have any force behind it 
until 196859 when the Supreme Court held in Green v. County School 
Board60 that the school board's '"freedom-of-choice plan,"' in which 
black and white students could choose to attend either the white or 
black school, did not satisfy a school district's duty to eliminate all 
vestiges of a dual system.61 Three years later in Swann v. Charlotte­
Mecklenburg Board of Education62 in 1971, the Court gave a further 
hand to desegregation by approving busing as a way to achieve 
integration (p. 107). 
However, as Bell acknowledged in his book, the Court's orders to 
desegregate through busing only induced white flight from urban areas 
and into the suburbs. 63 Although civil rights leaders tried to remedy 
the effects of residential segregation with interdistrict desegregation 
plans, the Supreme Court struck a heavy blow to these efforts just 
three years after Swann in Milliken v. Bradley,64 which significantly 
reduced any chances of achieving integration in spite of residential 
segregation when the Supreme Court rejected a federal district court's 
multi-district remedy to end de jure segregation that reached into the 
56. P. 7; see Sack, supra note 19 (asserting that in 1956, residents of North Carolina 
approved a constitutional amendment that gave local districts the authority to close down 
public schools and allowed white students to receive state aid to fund private schooling). 
57. For example, in Alabama, an unruly white mob chain-whipped a civil rights leader, 
the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, "and stabbed his wife as they tried to enroll their children 
in school." Sack, supra note 19. In Arkansas, Governor Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas 
National Guard to prevent nine black students from entering at Little Rock High School. 
P. 95. 
58. Brian Willoughby, The United States, Circa 1954, TEACHING TOLERANCE, Spring 
2004, at 47, 47. 
59. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 715 (2004) 
(describing how segregation remained intact in the first ten or more years after Brown). 
60. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green, the Supreme Court noted that '"[t]he time for mere 
"deliberate speed" has run out."' Id. at 438 (quoting Griffin, 377 U.S. at 234). 
61. Id. at 438; see also Adams, supra note 48, at 804 (maintaining that the Court became 
serious about implementing Brown in Green). 
62. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
63. Pp. 109-12; see also Bell, supra note 13. 
64. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) . 
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suburbs.65 As Bell notes, the effects of Milliken and later Supreme 
Court decisions concerning desegregation were devastating to all 
efforts to achieve integration (pp. 126-27). 
But as Bell explicates, the problem with achieving educational 
equality for minority children did not lie solely with the legal barriers 
to the physical integration of schools. As Bell explains, even when 
integration was in effect, minorities suffered significant harms as a 
result. For example, the one-way desegregation of moving minority 
children into white schools66 often resulted in the closing of numerous 
black schools, which required the firing of black teachers and 
principals.67 In many instances, black principals and teachers, even 
those with PhDs, found themselves working as janitors in schools to 
protect their pensions (pp. 124-25) .  Once revered in their communities 
as successes and role models, these persons were now degraded by a 
battle that was intended to assist all racial minorities. As a former 
teacher at the now defunct Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C. 
(which educated black leaders such as Judge William H. Hastie; Dr. 
Charles Drew, the discoverer of blood plasma; and Benjamin Davis, 
the first black general) ,68 once stated, " [Blacks] got what we fought 
for, but we lost what we had" (p. 125). 
More importantly, as Bell notes, in most majority schools, hostility 
to minority presence was high, making it difficult for minority children 
to integrate themselves fully within the schools (pp. 1 12-13). 
According to Bell, this hostility essentially doomed minorities for 
failure in predominantly white schools and left them in a far worse 
position than they would have encountered in their own schools, had 
those schools been equal (pp. 104-05, 121-23). White teachers, many of 
65. P. 111 .  The Court explained that, before the boundaries of separate and autonomous 
school districts could be set aside, it first had to be shown that there was a constitutional 
violation within one district that produced a segregative effect in another district. Milliken, 
418 U.S. at 744-45; see Liu, supra note 59, at 707, 724-27 (noting that the "racial and 
socioeconomic isolation of Detroit schoolchildren is due in no small part to the Court's 1974 
refusal to find the imperative of racially integrated schooling substantial enough to outweigh 
claims of suburban local control"). 
66. See Perea, supra note 48, at 1451 (maintaining that the language in Brown was white 
supremacist in that it "demanded one-way assimilation of Black and Latino students into 
formerly all-White educational environments"). 
67. Sam Tanenhaus, Black, White, and Brown, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 7 (book 
review), at 35 (a moderated discussion between Corne! West and Henry Louis Gates); see 
also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Voices of the Brown Generation: Description of a Project, 6 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 39, 40 n.3 (2004) (reporting that after 1954, there was a 90% 
reduction in the number of black principals in the South (citing JACQUELINE JORDAN 
IRVINE, BLACK STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES AND 
PRESCRIPTIONS 40-41 (1990)). 
68. See Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence: The Case of Dunbar High School, PUB. INT., 
Spring 1974, at 3, 4 (detailing the history of Dunbar High School and what such history may 
suggest for the education of bl&::k children). 
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whom had previously had no contact with minority children, were 
often ill-equipped to deal with the issues that minority children faced 
because of harassment at school, culture and language differences, and 
poverty at home69 and, in many instances, these same teachers held 
low expectations for what minority children could achieve in the 
classroom.70 In fact, as Bell highlights, due to "tracking" based on 
intellectual ability, minority children, especially Blacks and Latinos, 
were "barely tolerated guests in matters of curriculum, teacher 
selection, and even social activities" (p. 1 13), as tracking often resulted 
in minority and white children being segregated within the classroom, 
with white children generally being admitted to accelerated or 
advanced programs and Blacks and Latinos being relegated to 
inferior tracks. 71 
Because of all these factors, Bell maintains, Brown achieved much 
less than it is credited for accomplishing. To Bell, while the struggles 
of civil rights lawyers (including himself) and activists72 were 
admirable, impressive, and hard-fought, Brown now holds only limited 
meaning as a symbol of racial equality. In Bell's eyes, the better road 
would have been to enforce "separate but equal" as a means of 
ultimately attaining the goal of good minority schools. This would in 
turn cause Whites to reach their own decision to integrate based on 
economic reasons. Indeed, Bell notes that, during the 1960s as he was 
working to enforce orders to desegregate public schools, school 
officials would inform him "that they were quietly pleased that 
[the] NAACP . . .  had filed suit because they could not afford to 
maintain two sets of schools." (p. 106). The question then becomes: Is 
Bell right? 
69. See Perea, supra note 48, at 1442-44 (describing how Latino students' language 
issues were ignored and many Latino students were punished for speaking Spanish); cf 
Vanessa Siddle Walker & Kim Nesta Archung, The Segregated Schooling of Blacks in the 
Southern United States and South Africa, 47 COMP. EDUC. REV. 21, 26 (2003) (asserting that 
black "children bring their own unique cultural styles to education and that White teachers 
often fail to understand and appreciate these traditions"). 
70. P. 122; see also Perea, supra note 48, at 1442-43 (describing how teachers assumed 
that Mexican-American children were Jess intelligent than their Anglo counterparts, a 
stereotype referred to as the "pobrecito symdrome"). 
71. P. 112; see also JOHN U. 0GBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT 
SUBURB: A STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 97 (2003) (noting that leveling or 
tracking "ensured that the two races [black and white] would be educated separately or 
would not receive equal education"). 
72. As some have noted, many of the "foot soldiers," including the plaintiffs in 
prominent court cases, "go unheralded." Sherman Willis, Bridging the Gap: A Look at the 
Public Higher Education Cases Between Plessy and Brown, T. MARSHALL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2, on file with author); see also Sack, supra note 19 
(stating that "the thousands of young foot soldiers who desegregated their schools have 
received glancing mention in the history books"). 
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III. CONFRONTING AUTHORITY73 
I understand black folks who say "We ought to focus on resources," 
because some of them are not going to have desegregated schools. And a 
lot of black folks are tired of chasing white people, and I understand that, 
too. But nothing in our experience as a nation teaches us that racial 
segregation is going to be something that's good for our children. 
- Ted Shaw, President and Director-Counsel 
of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund74 
I agree with Bell's understanding of racism, his explanation of how 
race operates in politics, and his analysis of how a pure focus on 
integration in itself was ultimately damaging. I disagree with Bell's 
contention in Silent Covenants that enforcing "separate but equal" 
alone would have been the better path. To my mind, regardless of the 
road taken between the two, minorities, especially Blacks and Latinos, 
would have found themselves in the same racially precarious position 
in America's public schools. In fact, Bell's own interest-convergence 
theory supports my view that minorities would have, even under Bell's 
alternative plan, remained at the bottom of the well. 
This Part of the Review is divided into two subsections. In Part 
III(A), I apply Bell's interest-convergence theory to show why the 
alternative "separate but equal" approach proposed by Bell would not 
have resulted in better circumstances for minorities in America's 
public schools. First, in Part III(A)(l), I use Bell's theory to show why 
white and minority interests never would have converged to enable an 
attempt to equalize all public schools. I then explain why it would have 
been impossible to achieve equality in a segregated system that was 
based on white supremacy and was a matter of concession, rather than 
choice. Then, in Part III(A)(2), I use Bell's theory to show why 
equality in schools would not have been achieved under Bell's plan 
even if Whites ultimately chose to integrate schools because of 
economic reasons (rather than because of a true belief and 
commitment to eliminating white hegemonic power). Finally, in Part 
III(B), I address Bell's claim in Silent Covenants that the Brown 
decision has only limited meaning as a symbol of equality by 
73. DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT 
PROTESTER ( 1994) is Bell's third book, which details his reflections on his protest over 
Harvard Law School's failure to hire and grant tenure to any woman of color. Ultimately, 
Bell became tired of the Jaw school's failure to diversify its faculty by hiring a woman of 
color and left his job at the prestigious institution. See Wing, supra note 8 (reviewing Id. ). 
74. Ben Feller, Brown v. Board of Education: Half-Century Later, Are Schools More 
Separate or More Equal?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 16, 2004, at www.signonsandiego. 
com/uniontrib/20040516/news_mzlell6feller.html. 
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highlighting, on a practical level, Brown's "role in the transformation 
of American race relations. "75 
A. 
1 .  
Although I readily accept the two prongs of Bell's interest­
convergence theory, I believe that Bell fails, in his book, to provide a 
convincing reason for why white policymakers, especially in light of his 
theory, would have held an interest in truly attempting to equalize 
minority schools.76 The fact remains that, despite stark contrasts in 
black and white schools for more than fifty years,77 white policymakers 
made no real attempts to equalize facilities for minority children. As 
Bell himself reported in his book, in 1926, thirty years after Plessy, the 
disparities between student spending on Blacks and Whites in Georgia 
remained shockingly wide, with "an average per-pupil expenditure of 
$36.29 for whites and $4.59 for blacks" (p. 15), and yet no effort had 
been made to reduce that gap. The only time any movement was made 
to equalize schools was when schools feared that integration would be 
forced upon them. In this sense, given the efforts that school districts 
made to "equalize" public schools to avoid integration,78 Bell has some 
basis for believing that equalization could have occurred despite state­
mandated segregation. But even so, that motivation would not have 
existed without a true fear of forced racial mixing.79 Even if the Court 
had written Bell's proposed opinion with its threat of forced 
integration if no equalization, what would have enabled courts to 
enforce the equality of facilities and resources in schools any more 
than they were able to enforce racial desegregation? 
Also, Bell does not adequately explain how true equality in public 
schools could have emerged in a system in which the separation of the 
75. Mark V. Tushnet, Litigation Campaigns and the Search for Constitutional Rules, 6 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 101 (2004). 
76. Cf Clarence Page, Rethinking 'Brown'?, BALT. SUN, May 20, 2004, at 21A ("White 
segregationists defied, circumvented and simply ignored Brown's desegregation orders. 
There's little reason to believe they would have been any more sanguine toward an 
invigorated version of Plessy. ") .  
77. See, e.g., Walker & Archung, supra note 69, at 29 (noting that in the 1920s, the most 
expensive school built for Blacks in one county in North Carolina cost $4,465 and 
comparably sized white schools had building budgets that ranged from $9,000 to $15,000). 
78. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 491-92 & n.9 (describing how Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Delaware were making substantial efforts to equalize the schools in response 
to litigation seeking compulsory integration). 
79. Moreover, how would one measure this equality to determine if it had been 
achieved? See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 105. As Professor Cass Sunstein inquired, "To 
produce genuine equality, would [courts] have had to ask local school boards to raise taxes, 
or to take funds from white schools for the benefit of black schools?" Id. 
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races was based on a belief in white superiority. Plain and simple, had 
the Court, Blacks, and other minorities focused on enforcing "separate 
but equal" in public schools, such a decision would not really have 
been their choice, but rather a concession of defeat.so In other words, 
as the proposed opinion details, schools would remain segregated not 
because Blacks and other minorities wished them to remain so but 
instead because the Court was giving in to societal prejudices. What 
meaning then would this choice have had? In fact, studies show that 
the school-performance gap remains so long as racial stratification, 
including "forced" segregation, exists.st 
Moreover, Bell does not account for the failures of civil rights 
lawyers' pre-integration strategies, which, although primarily focused 
on equalizing factors that benefited the black middle class, such as 
teacher salaries,s2 also addressed the need to decrease the gap between 
the resources spent on the education of black and white children.s3 
Indeed, part of the original desegregation strategy was similar to Bell's 
plan in that it was intended to force white officials, through successful 
equalization cases, "to pay prohibitively high sums for the luxury of 
maintaining separate school systems, and thus, indirectly encourage 
80. Cf ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 188 (1993) ("The pain of 
[black] professionals . . .  is more often than not rooted in feelings of exclusion. In attempting 
to escape that pain, some blacks end up, in effect, inviting increased isolation. When the 
successful black lawyer declares that he will 'go to my own people for acceptance' because 
he no longer expects approbation from whites, he is not only expressing solidarity with other 
members of his race, he is also conceding defeat. He is saying that he is giving up hope of 
ever being anything but a talented 'nigger' to many of his white colleagues, that he refuses to 
invest emotionally in those who will never quite see him as one of them, whatever his 
personal and professional attributes."); Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and 
the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 729, 748 (2001) (asserting that "the choice to live in a black neighborhood often 
constitutes acceptance of defeat in trying to fully enter the American mainstream"). 
81. See John U. Ogbu, Racial Stratification and Education in the United States: Why 
Inequality Persists, in EDUCATION: CULTURE, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 772 (A.H. Halsey 
et al. eds., 1997). This is not to say that minorities cannot succeed in schools without the 
presence of Whites. See Amy Stuart Wells, The "Consequences" of School Desegregation: 
The Mismatch Between the Research and the Rationale, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 779 
(2001) (asserting that the educational outcomes of black students do not necessarily hinge on 
the racial make-up of their schools). Certainly, minorities can. Studies, however, have shown 
that poor or working-class minorities benefit from integration, not because of the presence 
of Whites, but because of increased access to powerful networks and to information about 
colleges, scholarships, jobs, and other opportunities. See id. at 780, 785-88. 
82. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 
How. L.J. 499, 520 (2004) (stating that the NAACP successfully received state-endorsed 
settlements in teacher salary equalization cases in Maryland, Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Arkansas, South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and that "[a]s a result, Black 
teachers went from earning 50 percent of what White teachers earned in 1930, to earning 65 
percent of White teacher salaries in 1945"). 
83. See Tushnet, supra note 75, at 102 (stating that the "litigation campaign began with 
cases that sought to require school districts to take the equality component of 'separate but 
equal' seriously"). 
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them to consider integration."84 What Bell neglects to address, 
however, is that this strategy proved to be a failure because of costly 
data collecting and plaintiff buy-offs, leaving minority and white 
schools still severely unequal and compelling NAACP lawyers to 
abandon such strategy in part because of costs85 and in part because 
they recognized that Whites would only protect the school system if 
they were in it.86 
In essence, as Ted Shaw, President and Director-Counsel of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, recently declared, 
"nothing in our experience as a nation [has taught] us that racial 
segregation is going to be something that's good for [minority] 
children."87 In fact, studies have shown that, even in affluent black 
communities88 where black professionals have chosen to live in all­
black suburbs (not necessarily because they do not want to live in 
integrated neighborhoods, but because of a desire to be free of racism 
in their own homes),89 racial isolation has proven to be harmful for 
"middle-class black enclaves"90 and the schools within them. Because 
of a variety of factors, including discriminatory real estate agents, 
black middle-class neighborhoods tend to be located closer to poor 
neighborhoods, which often results in making black middle-class 
neighborhoods more subject to poverty, higher crime, failing schools, 
and fewer services than in white middle-class neighborhoods.91 
Additionally, black middle-class neighborhoods are often on the 
opposite side of areas that attract businesses that will add to their 
commercial tax base, leaving community schools with less funding 
than in comparable white middle-class neighborhoods. For example, 
Prince George's County, an affluent black middle-class area, is located 
84. Ogletree, supra note 82, at 519; see also Tushnet, supra note 75, at 102-05. 
85. See Ogletree, supra note 82, at 520; Tushnet, supra note 75, at 102-05. 
86. See Symposium Discussion, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 13, 146 (2004) (involving a 
discussion in which Professor Tushnet asserted that integration is a means of ensuring 
adequate financial resources for minority children because "green follows white"). 
87. Feller, supra note 74. 
88. I should note that black and white "social classes are not equal in development 
and . . .  are qualitatively different." See Ogbu, supra note 81, at 769; see also MELVIN L. 
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH I WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1997) (asserting that when factors other than income are included, 
black families are significantly worse off than white families with similar incomes). 
89. See Cashin, supra note 80, at 730, 733-34 (detailing how many black professionals' 
decisions to live in predominantly black middle-class suburbs is not a pure choice, but in a 
sense, a settlement). 
90. See id. at 755-70; see also Lawrence Hardy, The New Diversity, AM. SCH. BOARD. J., 
Apr. 2004, at 40, 42 (reporting that "[e]ven middle-class African-American families tend to 
live in very different and much poorer communities than working-class white families"). 
91. See Cashin, supra note 80, at 755-70 (citing Myron Orfield, who connects such 
economic isolation to racism within the real estate industry). 
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in the opposite direction due west of the "fast growing high-tech 
corridors of Northern Virginia," and has encountered difficulties in 
drawing in business that could improve the area's tax base and thus its 
schools.92 Ultimately, all of these factors eventually affect the public 
schools in these black middle-class areas, which become increasingly 
segregated as the neighborhoods segregate93 and which have a higher 
concentration of low-income students than comparable schools in 
similarly affluent white areas, students who often require a greater 
need for services that may consume the school's resources more 
quickly.94 In the end, black middle-class neighborhood schools do not 
fare as well as their white counterparts in traditional measurements of 
academic achievement.95 In sum, even for the black elite, racial 
segregation that is not truly voluntary has proven to be damaging. 
2. 
Most of all, even if one were to accept Bell's claim that Whites and 
white policymakers would have ultimately decided to integrate public 
schools because it is much more economically efficient to maintain 
one good school system as opposed to two separate but equally good 
systems, there is no reason to believe that the overall quality of 
education offered to black children would have improved. After all, if 
the motivation behind integrating the schools was to avoid the 
economic costs of equalizing black schools, then Whites and white 
policymakers certainly would have decided to integrate long before 
the black schools ever became equalized or of sufficient quality. 
Moreover, there is no reason to think that true integration, both social 
and academic, would exist within these new physically integrated 
environments.96 As Bell himself notes in his brief discussion of 
92 See id. at 756-58 (noting that the same pattern exists in black middle-class areas in 
Atlanta and Chicago). Furthermore, as the black middle-class population increases in 
neighborhoods, Whites leave, causing an influx of lower income individuals to move in and 
ultimately resulting in higher tax rates, higher public debt, and overextended use of school 
public services. See id. at 756-57. 
93. See id. at 759 (stating that "Prince George's County schools have gone from being 20 
percent black in 1973 to nearly 80 percent black" in 2001). 
94. See id. at 759-60 (acknowledging that more than half of the school system's students 
qualify for free or reduced-price lunches). 
95. See id. at 759. For instance, the public schools in Prince George's County, although 
the area itself contains some of the most affluent black communities in the country, "have 
the second lowest test scores in Maryland." See id. at 732, 759. 
96. Even today, several integrated school districts in the South maintain the outdated 
practice of hosting racially segregated proms for Blacks and Whites. See Charles T. 
Clotfelter, An Imperfect Desegregation, CHRON . HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 2, 2004, at B9 
(describing how, from 1971 to 2002, and again in 2004, several school districts in the South 
"decided to discontinue the tradition of holding a springtime prom, allowing instead 
separate, privately sponsored proms for white and black students"). 
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tracking, even in schools that are supposedly integrated, two separate 
academic schools often emerge for Whites and minorities intemally.97 
Indeed, even when integration is voluntary and sought after by 
well-meaning Whites who want to have claim to living in an 
"integrated neighborhood," the interests of minorities, as Bell would 
say, are eventually sacrificed once that claim of physical integration 
has been achieved. The best example of this phenomenon is the public 
school system in Shaker Heights, Ohio, which has a significant black 
middle-class population,98 one of the best school systems in the nation, 
and a community that has worked to maintain its racial diversity 
through special city-sponsored programs.99 Even in Shaker Heights, 
where many white residents assert that they value diversity in their 
neighborhoods (and not just because of economic interests), 
segregation and inequality persist within the schools.100 For example, 
the late Professor John Ogbu of the University of California-Berkeley 
found that while 93 percent of all students in the lowest track of 
courses in the Shaker Heights school system were black, more than 94 
percent of all those enrolled in the highest track - Honors and 
Advanced Placement ("AP") courses - were white.101 Furthermore, 
97. Pp. 1 12-13; see also Jean Kluver & Larry Rosenstock, Choice and Diversity: 
Irreconcilable Differences?, PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP, Apr. 2003, at 12, 14 ( "Many public 
schools that appear integrated on paper are actually internally segregated because of 
academic tracking, student and parent choices within schools, and other school policies."); 
Sack, supra note 19 (reporting that at Greensboro High School, which is 62 percent white 
and 30 percent black, AP and honors courses are, on average, 80 percent white and 1 1  
percent black). 
98. This measure of class was based on income alone. According to Ogbu, 58 percent of 
the white households and 32.6 percent of the black households had an average family 
income of $50,000 to over $100,000. See OGBU, supra note 71, at xii. But cf Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 405, 428 (2000) ("Most blacks who fall into the middle class by virtue of their 
income do not possess the other indicators of middle-class stability such as property 
ownership, manageable debt, and savings. Instead, 'blacks' claim to middle-class status is 
based on income and not assets."') (footnote omitted). 
99. See OGBU, supra note 71, at xii, 59-60 (noting that the suburb "became a model of 
voluntarily self-integrated community, discouraged 'White flight,' and promoted diversity"). 
100. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 61 (discussing a comparison of Shaker Heights High 
School to Little Rock High School). I should note, however, that while black students in 
Shaker Heights lagged far behind their white peers, black students in the district perform 
considerably better than other black students in the rest of the country. See id. 
101. See John U. Ogbu, Black-American Students and the Academic Achievement Gap: 
What Else You Need to Know, J. THOUGHT, Winter 2002, at 9, 11 ;  see also OGBU, supra note 
71, at 1 10-11. One eleventh grade student explained this discrepancy as the result of racial 
course preferences, stating: 
Um, well in the Shaker school system, uh, the preference [of Black students] seems to be the 
lower classes, like college prep classes, and not so much the honors and advanced placement 
classes. Um, obviously the work is easier, and the standards of getting by are much lower. . . .  
And um, unfortunately a lot of um, uh Black students have that mentality . . .  so they tend to 
take those lower classes. 
See OGBU, supra note 71, at 16. 
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Professor Ogbu found that, even though Blacks accounted for less 
than 50 percent of the students in the district, Blacks received more 
than 80 percent of the Ds and Fs reported by various departments of 
Shaker Heights High School.102 In many instances, the tracks on which 
the children were placed were determined at an early age in 
elementary school, with little room for movement at higher levels.103 
If the problems within the Shaker Heights public school system are 
indicative, then there is no reason to believe that minorities would be 
in any better position today had Bell's "separate but equal" strategy 
been in place. Unless there is a true attack on and reversal of the 
dominant, societal belief in white superiority and minority inferiority, 
segregation within schools is certain to follow. As Bell himself 
indicates, segregation within schools is no more favorable than 
segregation among schools (pp. 121-25). Indeed, the effects of such 
racially disproportionate tracking in schools, along with the rampant 
perception that Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites, can have 
- and has had - a significant impact on the performance of minority 
students, even those who are in advanced classes and otherwise 
excelling in school.104 For example, as Professor Ogbu and his 
researchers learned in Shaker Heights, some black students avoided 
Honors or AP courses because they were dominated by white students 
and because many of the black students in Honors or AP courses felt 
uncomfortable being the only Black or one of a few black students in a 
course.105 Furthermore, Professor Ogbu and his associates found that 
when Blacks were placed in the honors or AP classes in the Shaker 
Heights district, white students in such classes often did not want to 
work or study with the black students; additionally, these white peers 
rarely included their black counterparts in social activities and 
conversations, making many Blacks feel unwelcome in the courses.106 
Moreover, as Professor Ogbu and his researchers discovered, in many 
instances, teachers held lower expectations for their black students, 
deciding not to give homework in predominantly black classes because 
the students would not do it, or tolerating certain behavior in 
predominantly black classrooms that would not be acceptable in 
102. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 36; see also Lynette Clemetson, Trying to Close the 
Achievement Gap, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1999, at 36, 36 (reporting that although Blacks make 
up less than the half of Shaker High School's population, "they regularly account for less 
than 10 percent of those at the top of the class and nearly 90 percent of the bottom"). 
103. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 1 1 1 ,  262-64. 
104. See id. at 84-85. 
105. See id. at 8, 112, 191, 199, 263. 
106. See id. at 85, 190-91, 199. 
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predominantly white classrooms. 107 Likewise, many of the black 
students' peers viewed them as intellectually inferior.108 In essence, the 
problem was not with the desire to want physically integrated schools, 
but the way in which a belief in white supremacy, whether conscious 
or unconscious, permeated the system.109 In fact, Professor Ogbu 
observed that some black students acted, both consciously and 
unconsciously, as though they were not as intelligent as Whites.110 
Above all else, the issues in the Shaker Heights school district 
reveal that, although integration may have ultimately emerged under 
Bell's proposed "separate but equal" plan due to economic interests, 
there is nothing to suggest that white policymakers would have 
maintained any interest in ensuring equality for minorities and Whites 
within the school system after actual physical integration and 
expenditure savings had occurred - when the interests of many 
Whites and the policymakers would have been satisfied. As the Shaker 
Heights example indicates, even when Blacks and Whites voluntarily 
integrate, unless racial hegemony is attacked at its core, disparities in 
education will persist because of racism.m Additionally, social mistrust 
between races will be present at high levels. Indeed, as Professor Ogbu 
and his research associates noted, many of the Blacks in the Shaker 
Heights area expressed that there was a "code of silence" about race 
within the community, with residents of the suburb living in partially 
integrated neighborhoods but leading segregated lives. In fact, when 
the racial achievement gap between Blacks and Whites in the Shaker 
Heights district was first revealed, many Blacks were angered by the 
disclosure of the statistics because they viewed such action as an 
attempt by Whites in the community to make Blacks "look bad. "112 
107. See id. at 17, 107, 126-28, 130-33. At the high school level, black students were also 
disciplined in numbers disproportionate to white students. See id. at 136-41. 
108. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 78-81 (also reporting that 82 percent of 1 ,300 students 
surveyed stated that people in their families and community believed that white people 
considered Blacks less intelligent than Whites). 
109. See Austin, supra note 16, at 85 (recognizing how "notions of black inferiority and 
white supremacy still taint educational policies and practices in this country"). 
1 10. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 260. As many scholars have found, such internal 
segregation within schools has in part contributed to a cultural attitude among Blacks that 
certain successes in school constitute "acting White." See id. at 24-25, 85-86, 189, 199-205. 
Indeed, in one article, a young Howard University-bound student from a Virginia suburb 
reported that he had been called a sellout and proclaimed that "(i]f you try hard in school, 
you are seen as being white." Patrick Welsh, When the Street and the Classroom Collide, 
WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at Bl .  
111 .  See Austin, supra note 16,  at  93 ("(W]hite intellectual, cultural, and moral 
superiority is still the dominant ideological underpinning of education in America . . . .  
[T]oday, the schools are simply not structured to produce successful, competent, and 
confident black students . . . .  "). 
1 12. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 71. 
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Finally, even if Bell's "separate but equal" plan had been adopted 
and Whites and white policymakers had chosen "voluntarily" to 
integrate for economic reasons, all factors indicate that there would 
eventually be a breaking point at which many Whites would revert 
back to segregation, causing a return to previous inequities (that is, 
unless true equality between the races and sincere appreciation of 
other races through exposure to diversity had been reached). 1 13 In fact, 
as studies have shown, even with voluntary integration in middle-class 
neighborhoods, there is a breaking point at which many Whites will 
leave the integrated area, as racial hierarchy in our society has not 
been successfully challenged. Specifically, studies have demonstrated 
that a 30-40 percent black presence in a neighborhood usually 
produces an exodus of Whites from the area.114 Indeed, despite having 
one of the best school systems in the nation, more Whites - even 
well-meaning Whites who claim to value diversity - are fleeing the 
suburbs of Shaker Heights as its system becomes increasingly black 
due to the fear that their children will become a powerless minority in 
the public schools.115 Indeed, it is ironic that these same Whites, many 
of whom recognize how damaging it can be to be an "outsider" or a 
"minority," continue to perpetuate this racist segregated system. 
Moreover, such actions raise the question of whether it matters if 
desegregation is involuntary or, as Bell suggests, voluntary (when that 
"voluntariness" is not based on a true commitment to defeating racial 
hierarchy and institutionalized racism). As Bell's own theory suggests, 
wherever the interest of minorities have been acknowledged solely 
because of a convergence with white interests, those very same rights 
and interests will eventually come to be disregarded. In essence, 
minorities were damned if we did, and damned if we did not. But to 
my mind, if given the choice, it was better for us to be damned with 
what the vast majority of society perceives as a moral victory in Brown 
and with at least the widely accepted societal goal of striving for true 
racial equality that came out of Brown. 
113. See john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Brown is not Brown and Educational 
Reform ls Not Reform If Integration ls Not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343, 
350 (2003) ("True integration in our schools, then, is not assimilative but transfonnative."). 
1 14. See Cashin, supra note 80, at 744-45 & n.87 ("Once blacks reach a presence of more 
than 40% of a neighborhood, within a few years the neighborhood will typically become 
majority-black if not all-black." (citing Reynolds Farley et al., Continued Residential 
Segregation in Detroit: "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs" Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 1, 29 
(1993)). Cashin further notes that Whites are generally willing to pay a 13 percent premium 
to live in an all-white neighborhood. Id. at 738. 
115. See OGBU, supra note 71, at 65; see also Cashin, supra note 80, at 768-71 (describing 
studies that show that both Whites and Blacks prefer integration only when their groups are 
in the majority). 
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B. 
Equally as important as Brown's moral victory was its impact on 
the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the United States. 
Indeed, two camps of scholars have explored and articulated the 
importance of the decision on effecting social change. For some, such 
as Professor Mark Tushnet, Brown had a direct and forceful impact on 
the success of the Civil Rights Movement and landmark civil rights 
legislation enacted during the 1960s.116 According to these scholars, 
Brown gave Blacks hope that racial equality would be achieved and 
that the rights of Blacks would be recognized, thereby shaping and 
helping to forge a more aggressive Civil Rights Movement, a 
movement that would result in strong anti-discrimination statutes such 
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.117 For others, such as Professor Michael Klarman, the effects of 
Brown were more indirect.118 As Professor Klarman explained his 
theory about how the decision indirectly shaped racial change: 
Brown created a political climate conducive to the brutal suppression of 
civil rights demonstrations. When such violence occurred, and was 
vividly transmitted through the medium of television to national 
audiences, previously indifferent northern whites were aroused from 
their apathy, leading to demands for national civil rights legislation which 
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations no longer deemed it politically 
expedient to resist.119 
Regardless of which camp one falls in, the direct or indirect Brown 
effect camp, the undeniable truth is that Brown certainly helped to 
transform race relations in this country.120 Whether it ignited racial 
change because of a stronger belief that Blacks' rights and interests 
would be acknowledged and protected or whether it effected change 
in a more perverse manner by creating southern resistance that 
116. See Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 173, 179 (1994); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991); see also Jack Greenberg, The Supreme 
Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520, 1522 (1968). 
117. Kenneth B. Clark, Racial Justice in Education: Continuing Struggle in a New Era, 
23 How. L.J. 93, 95; Howard A. Glickenstein, The Impact of Brown v. Board of Education 
and Its Progeny, 23 How. L.J. 51 ,  55 (1980); Nathaniel R. Jones, The Desegregation of Urban 
Schools Thirty Years After Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 553 (1984). 
118. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights 
Movement, SO VA. L. REV. 7, 85-150 (1994). 
119. See id. at 11 .  
120. See Angela P .  Harris, Introduction, 55 FLA. L .  REV. 319, 328 ("The revolution 
marked by Brown v. Board of Education and the antidiscrimination statutes passed during 
the "Second Reconstruction" brought housing, employment, and education into the realm of 
'the public' . . . .  "). But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 107-56 (1991) (contending that Brown carried little legal 
or social significance). 
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invoked the sympathies of northern Whites and politicians, Brown 
helped to change a nation. In sum, the Brown decision was and is 
more than a symbol of racial equality. It was the impetus of a 
movement that worked to change how Americans viewed and thought 
about race and resulted in important legislation that helped to protect 
the civil liberties of Blacks and other minorities, even though, as Bell 
points out, with dwindling force today. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Bell asserts in Silent Covenants that Brown 
"provided politicians with a racial issue through which to enrage and 
upset large groups of white people" (p. 7) rather than bringing about a 
true transformation of racial inequality. For Bell, Brown failed 
because it attempted integration before Whites could discover that 
integration was in their interests - at least economically - and thus 
resulted ultimately in white flight to the suburbs121 and a whole host of 
other factors that doomed the vast majority of minority children to 
educational failure. Indeed, Bell's reasoning (p. 20-23)' sounds 
ironically like Justice Brown's pronouncement in Plessy that law "is 
powerless to eradicate racial instincts . . .  and the attempt to do so can 
only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. "122 
Of course, who can blame Bell for voicing the ways in which 
integration in public schools has proven to be damaging to the psyche 
of minority students, especially Blacks and Latinos, who are viewed by 
many as intellectually inferior to Whites? As Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. once expressed, integration in schools can be a different sort of 
animal. As Dr. King explained: 
In [the school] setting, you are dealing with one of the most important 
assets of an individual - the mind. White people view black people as 
inferior. A large percentage of them have a very low opinion of our race. 
People with such a low view of the black race cannot be given free rein 
and put in charge of the intellectual care and development of our boys 
and girls.123 
In all, the reality of Dr. King's words leaves many minorities 
wondering: is integration worth it? Like Professor Sheryll Cashin, 
121. Bell, supra note 13 (noting that "the fear of sending their children to desegregated 
schools led many white parents either to move to mainly white school districts or to enroll 
their children in private, all-white schools"). 
122 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
123. Samuel G. Freedman, Still Separate, Still Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 7 
(book review), at 8 (discussing the views of three eminent black law professors who 
benefited from Brown yet express cynicism about integration). 
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many of us are '"ambivalent integrationist[ s ]' suffering from 
'integration exhaustion. "' 124 
But if, as Bell asserts, history is telling, it seems clear that the 
enforcement of "separate but equal" alone would not have left 
minorities in a better position than they are in today. After all, Whites 
still would have resisted truly equalizing the resources of schools for 
people they believed to be inferior.125 The message to Blacks and other 
minorities of all ages would have continued to be that they were not as 
"good" as Whites, and the injury to minority children that the Court 
highlighted in Brown, along with the injury to white children that the 
Court disregarded, 126 would have remained. 127 If so, why not at least 
have the moral and admittedly limited practical victories of the 
holding in Brown? 
As Zelma Henderson, one of the Topeka parents, proclaimed 
about the moral victory of Brown, "When you get right down to it, the 
message of the Brown decision . . .  is really that all human beings of all 
races are created equal. . . .  We went to the Supreme Court of the 
United States to affirm that fact, and we won."128 Regardless of the 
status of minorities today, that moral victory was significant. As 
Professor Dennis Hutchinson recently asserted, " [Brown] de­
legitimized Jim Crow. It said that the social attitude . . . .  this insulting, 
124. See id.; see also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE 
AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 9-10 (2004). This is not to say that 
the gains since Brown are unrecognized by minorities. Certainly, progress has occurred .  For 
example, since 1957, the number of Blacks with high school degrees is 10 times greater. See 
Sack, supra note 19. 
125. See Patterson, supra note 19, at B05 (stating that "[r]ecent state-court decisions 
mandating equality or adequacy in education have been very difficult to enforce"). Even if 
minorities could have succeeded in obtaining equal resources in segregated schools, 
minorities still would have been severely disadvantaged by a lack of access to the power 
structure, such as powerful alumni and status or prestige among employers in the 
community. See Adams, supra note 48, at 800-02; see also Wells, supra note 81, at 771 ,  785-88 
(arguing that Brown also reasoned that segregation was harmful because of intangibles such 
as the higher status that white public schools held in society "as well as the valuable social 
networks of the faculty and students within them"). 
126. See Perea, supra note 48, at 1458 (identifying these injuries as including "ignorance 
of other people, ignorance of the fact that Whiteness constitutes a racial identity, isolation 
from others, and feelings of guilt and shame, rather than a healthy sense of White identity" 
(footnotes omitted)); John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and 
the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1794 (2000) ("[Segregation] was a 
psychologically damaging and educationally destructive experience for my white friends and 
myself . . . .  It has taken literally decades for my generation to begin to shed the unconscious, 
but pernicious, grip of the segregated environments in which we were brought up, with all of 
the fears, suspicions, and misunderstandings that they created."). 
127. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 105 (maintaining that full enforcement of Plessy 
"would have done nothing about the injury produced by segregation"). 
128. Phillip Boyle, Brown and the Dream Deferred, AM. SCH. BOARD. J., Apr. 2004, at 
52, 54 (discussing how the plaintiffs in Brown understood the moral basis of the case). 
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demeaning, humiliating attitude that . . . white people have about 
black people - does not have the official imprimatur of the law."129 
Furthermore, there was a practical effect to Brown that was 
equally significant. As I suggested earlier, had there not been Brown, 
would segregation have tumbled so easily in other areas, such as with 
busing and other public accommodations?130 Moreover, what would 
have happened if Whites, in their efforts to equalize schools under 
Bell's "separate but equal" plan, had simply decided that their social 
interests in preventing race-mixing were much higher than their 
economic interests in funding only one school?131 Is this not what Bell 
astutely points out that many poor and working-class Whites have 
consistently done throughout history? 
The fact is that Brown gave society a goal to strive for and set the 
stage for a movement that created racial change. Brown was more 
than a legal decision; it was "a statement about the fundamental moral 
basis of democracy."132 In other words, what is important here is not 
whether "separate but equal" could have been achieved (which I do 
not believe was possible), but rather, as Ted Shaw proclaimed, 
whether we would have been "satisfied with that as a nation."133 The 
answer for many of us is a clear, resounding "No." Our ability to 
interact across racial lines allows us to learn about the differences in 
each other's culture and history, and more importantly, about what we 
have in common, what are our shared experiences, and what are our 
shared interests. It is only through this form of integration that true 
racial equality can be achieved.134 Indeed, the most recent debates 
regarding the Ten Percent Plan in the state of Texas reveal the ways in 
which integration and the discovery of once concealed, common 
interests can lead to the unearthing of race and class inequality. 
129. Symposium Discussion, supra note 86, at 122; see id. at 126 (involving a discussion 
in which Professor Regina Austin proclaimed that the decision's moral significance made for 
better lives for northern Blacks). 
130. See Ogletree, supra note 82, at 530-31 (describing how Brown broadened efforts to 
end segregation). 
131. Harris, supra note 15, at 1741-44. 
132. Boyle, supra note 128, at 53; see also Ogletree, supra note 82, at 500 ("Much of the 
significance of Brown flows not from what the opinion says but from an appreciation of what 
it hoped to eliminate: an American social, political, economic, and legal system that had once 
treated African descendants as property and, after the end of slavery, erected an alternative 
system of subjugation that treated them as second-class citizens." (emphasis added)). 
133. Feller, supra note 74; see also powell & Spencer, supra note 1 13, at 344 ("To 
challenge Plessy's 'separate but equal' is to go beyond separate as well as beyond equal in an 
effort not only to eradicate intentional discrimination, but to achieve true integration." 
(footnote omitted)). 
134. See powell & Spencer, supra note 1 13, at 349 (asserting that fixing racism "requires 
that we embrace true integration as an explicit goal"). 
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After the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that the use of 
race or ethnicity in admissions by the University of Texas School of 
Law was unconstitutional,135 the Texas Ten Percent Plan was 
adopted.136 This plan provided that any student in the top 10 percent 
of his or her high school class would receive automatic admission to 
the state institution of his or her choice.137 The Plan, of which similar 
versions have been adopted in Florida and California, 138 initially came 
under attack from numerous individuals for reversing the diversity 
which Texas universities were previously able to achieve;139 
nevertheless, it has allowed Texas state universities to maintain 
integration, largely because the secondary schools in Texas are 
segregated by race.140 
More importantly, the Plan, while certainly imperfect and 
ineffective at the graduate admissions level, has resulted in an 
admissions process that also tends to undermine the class privilege 
inherent in most universities' admission processes. The end result in 
Texas has been a backlash led by a group consisting primarily of 
wealthy parents whose children have been unable to gain acceptance 
to the state's flagship university in Austin.141 These parents argue that 
135. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
136. See Michelle Adams, Isn't It Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of 
"Percentage Plans," 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1737 (2001) (stating that in response to Hopwood 
in 1997, then Governor George W. Bush signed House Bill No. 588 into law). 
137. See Jonathan D. Glater, Diversity Plan Shaped in Texas ls Under Attack, N.Y. 
nMES, June 13, 2004, at Al. 
138. See Adams, supra note 136, at 1729-30 (pointing out that the three most populous 
states have adopted percentage plans). 
139. See, e.g. , Mary Frances Berry, How Percentage Plans Keep Minority Students Out of 
College, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 4, 2000, at A48 (arguing that the plans unfairly reject 
minority students who previously would have been admitted to state universities in Texas 
and been successful simply because they are not in the top 10% of their class); see also 
Adrien Katherine Wing, Race-Based Affirmative Action in American Legal Education, 51  J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 (2001) (reporting that in 1997, the entering class at the University of 
Texas School of Law had only four black students and twenty-six Mexican-American 
students compared with thirty-one Blacks and forty-two Mexican-Americans before). 
140. See Glater, supra note 137, (noting that the new freshman undergraduate class in 
2004 will more diverse than in pre-Hopwood years); cf Adams, supra note 136, at 1730 
(highlighting the "astoundingly ironic reality (that] . . .  percentage plans can work if and only 
if secondary education remains firmly segregated"). 
141. See Glater, supra note 137; see also Jennifer Radcliffe, College Admissions Rule 
Generates Debate About Equity; A Law That Guarantees Slots for Top Students at Texas 
Colleges ls Hailed and also Called Unfair, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 22, 2000, at 
4B (reporting that some critics of the Plan assert that some high schools have higher 
academic standards than others and better prepare their students for college"). But see 
Marta Tienda & Sunny Niu, Texas' JO-Percent Plan: The Truth Behind the Numbers, 
CHRON. HIGHER. EDUC., Jan. 23, 2004, at BlO (presenting results of a study that showed 
"little evidence that masses of students, including those who graduated from feeder schools, 
are being crowded out of the most selective public institutions in Texas," that 75 percent of 
students in the second decile have still been able to enroll in the state institution of their 
choice, and that "black students are [actually] 34 percent more likely than white students to 
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some high schools (such as their wealthier ones) are better than 
others, and "that managing to stay in the top 25 percent at a 
demanding school should mean more than landing in the top 10 
percent at a less rigorous one."142 Additionally, despite the fact that 
students admitted under the Ten Percent Plan consistently get better 
grades than white and wealthier students who would have been 
admitted under the old policy,143 these parents argue that the Ten 
Percent graduates from weaker high schools are not prepared to do 
the work at the elite public universities and that SAT scores, which 
highly correlate with socioeconomic class and generally predict 
nothing more than parental wealth,144 should be used instead.145 Given 
the wealth and collective power within the state of these protesting 
parents, their wishes (as even the President of the University of Texas 
concedes), are likely to be granted.146 
Although another plan that helps somewhat to protect minorities' 
access to higher education (although only on the college level) is at 
risk once again, some good news flows from this recent attack on the 
Ten Percent Plan: it has helped to further expose the upper-class bias 
in admissions and has caused some poor and working class Whites in 
Texas to connect their own class oppression to that of minorities.147 
The eyes of students and parents from rural white areas, which prior 
prefer non-Texas institutions over four-year Texas institutions, and that they prefer other 
four-year Texas institutions over the Austin and College Station campuses"). 
142 See Glater, supra note 137; Clarence Page, What Do You Do When a Diversity Plan 
Works Too Well?, BALT. SUN, June 17, 2004, at 19A (reporting that "a Texas-size backlash 
has erupted among parents from better-off high school districts who voice a novel complaint: 
reverse discrimination against overachievers"); see also Ruben Navarrette, Latest Texas 
Education Whine: Suburban Victimhood, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 18, 2004, at 31A 
(joking, "who knew that attending an elite high school could be considered a 
disadvantage?"). 
143. See Navarrette, supra note 142; see also Editorial, College Bound JO Percent Rule 
Works Well, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 20, 2004, at 2H (reporting that "the bulk of 
UT's 10 percenters did just as well or better on their grade point averages as those freshmen 
who had much higher SAT scores"). 
144. See supra note 45; Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at 
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1 13, 148-49 (2003) (detailing upper 
middle-class bias in admissions and asserting that "[q]uantative measures often reflect family 
resources and influence rather than a student's resourcefulness or intelligence"). 
145. See Glater, supra note 137. 
146. See Glater, supra note 137 (noting that the president of the University of Texas at 
Austin claims the Plan may need adjustment and that, post Grutter, the university plans to 
resume use of race as a factor in admissions). 
147. Clay Robison, Minority Leaders Urge State to Keep College 10% Rule, HOUSTON 
CHRON., June 24, 2004, at A17 (quoting the interim executive director of the Texas League 
of United Latin American Citizens, who responded to criticisms that the plan was unfair by 
saying "Join the club. (The admissions system) has never been fair for minorities. It's never 
been fair for poor, rural whites." (alteration in original)). 
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to the Ten Percent Plan had never sent a student to the University of 
Texas at Austin,148 have been further opened to see the ways in which 
they were disadvantaged by the elite school's previous admissions 
process, a view long held and understood by parents of students from 
impoverished minority schools.149 In the end, this revelation has 
created and maintained a stronger potential for long-term coalition­
building between poor Whites and minorities. As Bell argued in his 
book while discussing Hopwood, instead of a challenge by Whites on 
race-based affirmative action, a challenge by Whites that focused on 
the exclusionary tools of admissions in general would have assisted 
everyone, including poor and working-class Whites such as Cheryl 
Hopwood.150 Indeed, the current debates about the merits of the Texas 
Ten Percent Plan, even with its imperfections, certainly lend powerful 
support to Bell's comments concerning the upper-class bias in 
admissions across the nation151 and even suggest that the tides may be 
beginning to change. For example, as the Texas state legislature 
considers whether it can resolve the "problems" generated by the Plan 
with the implementation of course requirements for the Top Ten 
Percent students in the state, a discussion of funding and requiring all 
districts to provide a more advanced minimum curriculum has also 
occurred, a factor that many impoverished minority schools have 
desired for years and that could greatly improve the quality of 
education for the students in these schools.152 
Who knows? Perhaps, the long route from segregation to 
integration and back to segregation again was meant to lead us to this 
small coalition that attacks inequality at its core. Maybe one day, if 
asked, "For whom does the bell toll?," no student will have to answer, 
"It tolls for thee." The school bell, I mean. 
148. See Glater, supra note 137 (highlighting that the "number of schools that send their 
graduates to the University of Texas has risen by a third, from just over 600 to more than 
800"); Robison, supra note 147 (reporting that "the 10 percent law has created a more 
geographically diverse student body at UT, because many white students from property­
poor, rural districts - as well as minorities - have been admitted under it"). 
149. See Glater, supra note 137 (asserting that some of those requesting a change in the 
Plan are concerned about students at the state's elite schools in wealthy districts while some 
defenders of the Plan are concerned about students from poorer rural and urban areas). 
150. P. 141. In fact, Bell notes that such a challenge would have been more meaningful 
to an individual like Cheryl Hopwood, the lead plaintiff in Hopwood, as her denial of 
admission was more socioeconomic than racial. Pp. 144-45. 
151. See Don Erler, Don't Mess with Texas Plan, STAR-TELEGRAM.COM, June 29, 2004, 
at http://www.dfw.com/mld/startelegram/9037663.htm?lc (describing how the backlash about 
the plan is based on class bias, leading some to want "to turn back the clock to good old days 
of racial preferences"). 
152. See Michael May, The Cream of Every Crop: What Other States Can Learn from the 
Ten Percent Plan, TEXAS OBSERVER, July 7, 2001, at 5. 
